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GÁBOR HAMZA * 
 
Legal Traditions and Efforts to Unify (Harmonize) the 
Private Law in Europe 
 
 
Abstract. The present essay deals with the question of harmonization of private law in 
Europe. The author gives an overview of the efforts of European states to unify private law, 
also underlining the results and shortcomings of these activities. He highlights the importance 
of Roman law in the unification of private law. The author mentions — inter alia — the role 
of Roman law in the development of the non-antique, „modern” natural law by referring to 
the term of Entzauberung der Welt by Max Weber. In addition, he analyzes the influence of 
the historical school of jurisprudence (Pandektistik) on the development of European private 
law. The study presents a short summary on the activity of the Academy of Pavia. The 
members of this Academy, among whom one may find experts of Roman law, Common 
Law and private law make efforts to codify the European law of contracts, which should 
be regarded as a great step towards a unified European private law.  
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I. Recent efforts regarding unification (harmonization) of the private 
 law in the Member States of the European Union 
 
Resolution of the European Parliament (EC OJ 1989, C 158.400), adopted on 
May 26, 1989, requires that Member States make steps toward the codification 
of European private law (both civil and commercial law).1 Accordingly, the 
European Communities, pursuant to this resolution, established a Commission 
charged with developing the framework for the codification of European 
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1
 With regards to the harmonization in the field of private law and the background of 
harmonization in classical antiquity, see, Maroi, F.: Tendenze antiche e recenti verso 
l’unificazone internazionale del diritto privato. Roma, 1933. 7 sq. and 15. With regard 
to the importance Theophrastos’ Peri nomon, which, in essence, also serves the objectives 
of law harmonization, see, Hamza, G.: Jogösszehasonlítás és az antik jogrendszerek 
[Comparative Law and Legal Systems of Antiquity], Budapest, 1998. 17 sqq. 
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contracts law.2 In 1994, another resolution of the European Parliament (EC 
OJ C 205.518, April 27, 1994), once again called on the Member States to 
harmonize certain sections of their private law to provide for a uniform 
internal market.3 At its conference, held on 15–16 October, 1999 in Tampere, 
the European Council discussed the question once again. Article 39 of the 
declaration accepted by the European Council emphasizes the necessity of the 
harmonization of certain areas of the Member States’ private law.4 Resolution 
of the European Parliament (EC OJ 2001, C 327.255), adopted on November 
15, 2001, reaffirmed the necessity of the approximation of the civil and 
commercial law of the Member States. 
 In 1980, almost ten years prior to the adaptation of the 1989 Resolution, a 
working group, led by Professor Ole Lando of Copenhagen and called the 
Commission on European Contract Law, was formed, which, sponsored by the 
European Communities, has undertaken the task of developing the principles 
of European contract law.5 The Academy of European Private Lawyers 
(Académie des Privatistes Européens, Accademia dei Giusprivatisti Europei) 
with the seat in Pavia and consisting of mostly Roman law experts (including 
among others professors Peter Stein of Cambridge, who is the Vice President 
of the Academy, Theo Mayer-Maly of Salzburg, Fritz Sturm of Lausanne, Dieter 
Medicus of Munich, and Roger Vigneron of Liège), was founded in October 
1990. Within this Academy, comprising European civilists and Roman law 
scholars, enjoying great international reputation and working on the creation of 
a common European private law system, exists the Group d’étude pour le droit 
européen commun (GEDEC) which is currently drafting the a Code of European 
Contracts Law (Code Européen des Contrats).6 The proposed Code is modeled 
after the fourth book (regulating obligations) of the Italian Codice civile of 
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2
 See, Großfeld, B.—Bilda, K.: Europäische Rechtsangleichung, Zeitschrift für Rechts-
vergleichung Internationales Privatrecht und Europarecht 33 (1992), 426.  
 
3
 See, Staudenmayer, D.: Perspektiven des Europäischen Vertragsrechts. In: Die Schuld-
rechtsreform vor dem Hintergrund des Gemeinschaftsrechts (hrsg. von R. Schulze und H. 
Schulte-Nölke), Tübingen, 2001. 419. 
 
4
 See, Sonnenberger, H. J.: Privatrecht und Internationales Privatrecht im künftigen 
Europa: Fragen und Perspektiven. Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft 48 (2002), 489. 
 
5
 See, Lando, O.: Principles of European Contract Law. Rabels Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 56 (1992), 261 sqq. 
 
6
 Gandolfi provides an overview of the activities and achievements of the Academy of 
Pavia and the working group. G. Gandolfi: Pour un code européen des contrats. Revue 
trimestrielle de droit civil, 1992. 707 sqq. Compare with, Gaggero, P. G.: Il progetto di un 
codice europeo dei contratti: l’attività del gruppo di lavoro pavese. Rivista di diritto civile 
43 (1997), 113–120. 
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1942 (which incorporates many aspects of the tradition of the French Code civil 
and the of German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) and the Contract Code7 drafted in 
the 1960s and 1970s by Harvey McGregor from Oxford for the English Law 
Commission.8 Professor Giuseppe Gandolfi of Pavia, whose achievements in 
the field of Roman law research are also significant, has played a major role in 
establishing the Academy.9  
 Harmonization efforts, of course, are not without opposition. Professor 
Peter Ulmer of Heidelberg, for example, is quite skeptical regarding to the 
question of urging harmonization (unification) of law among the EU Member 
States.10 Jean Carbonnier, who doubts the urgency and even the necessity of 
harmonization, expresses similar views with relation to France. It seems that 
we are witnessing the codification debate between Anton Friedriech Justus 
Thibaut (1772–1840) and Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779–1871)—though, 
under historical conditions substantially different from the social and legal 
realities of the 1810s.  
 Although, it is, certainly, undecided whether Europe, at present, needs a 
unified legal system at all, it is obvious that harmonization in the field of civil 
(private) legislation—even if not to the same extent in every aspect of private 
law—is unavoidable. However, the way to realization of legal harmonization is 
uncertain. It could take the form of regulation or policy, and also could be 
realized via coordinated national legislation.11 The failure of England and 
Scotland in 1970 to adopt the unified Law of Contracts that would have been 
binding in both countries does not contradict the tendency toward efforts of 

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7
 See, McGregor, H.: Contract Code drawn up on behalf of the English Law 
Commission. Milano–London, 1993. 
 
8
 Until now, the debates of the Academy and working group of Pavia were published 
in two volumes. Incontro di studio sul futuro codice europeo dei contratti (Pavia, 20–21 
ottobre 1990). A cura di P. Stein (Milano, 1993) and Atti accademici (1992–1994), A cura 
di P. Stein (Milano, 1996). 
 
9
 The preliminary project plan of the Code Européen des Contrats (Avant-projet) was 
published in the edition of Professor Gandolfi. See, Code Européen des Contrats–Avant-
projet (ed.: Gandolfi, G.), Milano, 2001. Compare with, Gandolfi, G.: Der Vorentwurf eines 
Europäischen Vertragsgesetzbuches, Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 10 (2002), 1–4. 
 
10
 See, Ulmer, P.: Vom deutschen zum europäischen Privatrecht. Juristen Zeitung, 47 
(1992), 1 sqq. 
 
11
 See, Remien, O.: Rechtseinheit ohne Einheitsgesetze? Rabels Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 56 (1992), 30. and Illusion und Realität eines 
europäischen Privatrechts. Juristen Zeitung 47 (1992), 277 sqq. Compare with, Herber, R.: 
Deutsche Zivilrechtskodifikation und internationale Rechtsvereinheitlichtigung. Rechts-
dogmatik und Rechtspolitik (hrsg. von K. Schmidt), Berlin, 1990. 269. 
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European legal harmonization.12 Roman law (ius Romanum), which constitutes 
the historical foundation of the unity of European law, might have a crucial 
role in this undeniably long-term process, which could require perhaps decades 
of hard work.13 One circumstance ensuring that Roman law prevails is the 
application of the legal principles of private autonomy and freedom of contract, 
among other things, in European relations.14 Doubtless, however, these legal 
principles, stemming from Roman law, could become relatively important and 
materialized in certain areas. This is the situation, for example, in the field of 
consumer protection. The more emphasized and better founded legal protection 
of the consumer, who is the more disadvantaged participant in civil legal 
commerce, doubtlessly materializes in private-autonomy and the legal principle 
of freedom of contract within a given private law system. That is, the droit 
communautaire, without doubt, indicate certain tendencies that seem to 
jeopardize the freedom of contract.   
 In our view, Roman law may play an important role in the standardized, or 
at least in a tendency toward standardization, of European jurisprudence, and, 
more precisely, in the development thereof. Throughout Europe, in the age of 
ius commune, a uniform “legal working method,” the so-called stilus curiae 
predominated precisely through Roman law, which was considered the lingua 
franca of lawyers. The uniform stilus curiae following the “nationalization” of 
legal systems became part of the past. The training of legal professionals, 
which is becoming international once again, may eventually result in a 
harmonization similar to the stilus curiae.15  
 
 
II. Roman law traditions and unity of private law in Europe in a historical 
context  
 
Roman law played a significant role in both the secular and ecclesiastical 
sectors of medieval societies. It served as a foundation for the 16th century 
legal humanism and as a wellspring for the rationalist Natural Law doctrines. 

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12
 See, Tilman, W.: Kodifikation des Privatrechts in der Gemeinschaft. In: Für Recht 
und Staat, Festschrift für H. Helmrich zum 60. Geburtstag, München, 1994. 441. 
 
13
 Knütel, R.: Rechtseinheit in Europa und römisches Recht. Zeitschrift für Europäisches 
Privatrecht 2 (1994), 244 sqq. 
 
14
 See, Hommelhoff, P.: „Europarechtliche Bezüge” im Zivilrecht, Überlegungen zur 
Gestaltung des akademischen Unterrichts. In: Für Recht und Staat. Festschrift für H. 
Helmrich zum 60. Geburtstag, München, 1994. 340. 
 
15
 Ranieri, F.: Der europäische Jurist. Rechtshistorisches Forschungsthema und rechts-
politische Aufgabe, Ius Commune 17 (1990), 10 sqq.   
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In the 19th century, Roman law was molded in the sprit of scientific positivism 
primarily through Pandektistik (Pandektenwissenschaft), and, finally, was also 
an eminent material source of the great private law codices. The role of Roman 
law in the 20th century political sphere is not negligible, the most conspicuous 
sign of which is Article 19 of the party platform of NSDAP (National-
sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, the German National Socialist Labor 
Party) adopted on February 24, 1920 and supported by the interpretation of 
Alfred Rosenberg which may be viewed as an “interpretatio simplex”. The 
reception of Roman law, characterized—or rather, stigmatized—as foreign by 
the German people, and also seen as individualistic, cosmopolitan, materialistic, 
liberal, and advocating solely private interests, appeared as a national 
catastrophe (“nationales Unglück”) and tragic event (“Tragik”) in the legal 
literature of the 1930s’ Germany. It is worth mentioning that Carl Schmitt, in 
his study entitled „Aufgabe und Notwendigkeit des deutschen Rechtsstandes” 
(Deutsches Recht 6/1936/), labels Article 19 of the 1920 NSDAP party platform 
as something that demands the overshadowing of neglected Roman law through 
the initiation of “deutsches Gemeinrecht”, as „verfassungsrechtliche Bestimmung 
ersten Ranges” (sic! G. H.). Carl Schmitt, however, fails to support his rather 
peculiar view with legal arguments. Reading the literature of the era in 
question, it might seem that, quoting the ironic lines of Rusztem Vámbéry 
regarding the NSDAP’s proposed legislative reform, “the influence of Roman 
law had infected the puritan intellect of Teutons sipping Meth (honey-beer) 
sitting on bear hides in caverns of lost times.” 
 The trend of “antike Rechtsgeschichte” completely ignores the afterlife of 
both the jurisprudential and political aspects of Roman law. The advocates of 
the trend of “antike Techtsgeschichte,” hallmarked by the name of Leopold 
Wenger, fail to consider the fact that for centuries, Roman law has had a major 
influence on the evolution of European law and jurisprudence. In the case of 
Roman law, which can be rightly viewed as the “ius commune Europaeum”, 
the followers of this school, still represented by a few existing advocates today, 
completely disregard the role that Roman law plays, as a consequence of 
interpretatio multiplex, in the development of European law, and more 
precisely, in the legal systems and jurisprudence of European nations. In 
essence, this view narrows the possibility of comparison of legal systems of 
states or peoples on the same socio-economic level, but reaches similar 
conclusions. The undeniable advantage of this approach is, however, the sound 
foundation of the background of its synoptic view. On the other hand, this 
concept limits the possibility of comparison in such a degree that it nearly 
reaches the outermost boundaries of rationality. The frustration with this view 
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is manifested especially clearly in the works of Ernst Schönbauer, who 
restricted the possibility of comparison to the rather narrow territory of 
comparing the legal systems of ancient peoples that were on the same level of 
civilization or were ethnically related. This view relates in many aspects to the 
schools of thought according to which certain institutions of Roman law are 
incomparable with certain institutions of modern legal systems, because the 
former is the legal system of a slave-holding socio-economic formation. The 
followers of this school tend to forget about continuity, which plays an 
especially important role in the sphere of legal phenomena. 
 In the last quarter of the 20th century, Professor Uwe Wesel of Berlin 
polemicizes in his writing titled Aufklärungen über Recht, published in 1981, 
about the notion of legal structures reappearing from time-to-time—Theo 
Mayer-Maly writes aptly about “Wiederkehr von Rechtsfiguren”. This view-
point, concurring with the possibility of accepting reoccurring legal structures, 
is, naturally, not so radical as to deny the existence of legal structures 
exclusively linked to a single given socio-economic formation, such as, for 
example, feudal relationships, which, in itself excludes accepting Roman law 
as a timeless ratio scripta. Of course, it is the sign of déformation professionelle 
when lawyers overstate the facts, according to which legal transactions—the 
expression, legal transaction (negotium juridicum), is attributed to Johannes 
Althusius (1557/63–1683)—, or at least a fairly substantial fraction of these 
transactions could be performed by applying the same legal constructions 
regardless of the time factor. Fundamentally, however, this does not change the 
fact that the legislation and jurisprudence of recent years, in many countries 
within and outside Europe, returned more than once, even in concrete forms, to 
the constructions as well as the institutions of Roman law. 
 The fact of the expanding influence of tradition should not excuse the 
scholar from the requirement of analyzing the substantive differences and the 
prevailing economic functions. This is true, for example, although it might 
seem extreme at first sight, with respect to the examination of the regulations 
pertaining to cartels and monopolies or trusts. Roman cartel and monopoly or 
trust regulation, which is densely woven with the elements of ius publicum, 
obviously differs, for example, from modern cartel law, yet, the socio-economic 
forces working in the background—independently from the socio-economic 
system—doubtlessly intersect at certain points. 
 The expression ‘reception’, as it relates to Roman law, the meaning of 
which, if interpreted correctly, is not some sort of “cultural occupation”, but, at 
least in Germany, more like a notion that is equivalent to some kind of a 
“scientification” (Verwissenschaftlichung) of law. Reception cannot be connected 
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neither to the Reichskammergerichtsordnung, adopted in 1495, or to the 
mythical decree of emperor Lothar III, fading in the dimness of legends. The 
reception of Roman law means an intellectual tradition built on Roman legal 
foundations that only marginally relates to a well-defined positive legal 
system, ius positivum. Reception, defined in this manner, can be traced back 
centuries, with a good example being the conveyance of German lawyers who 
studied law at the universities of Northern Italy.  
 The signs of reception, i.e., the subsidiary prevalence of Roman law, 
associated with positive law, appeared fairly early, in the 11th century. And, in 
the 13th century, elements of Roman law can be found especially in the practice 
of ecclesiastical courts that often litigated disputes having the nature of private 
law. According to our view, the influence of the Commentators appears in the 
latter area, while Roman law, defined as “legal literature,” has already been 
accepted in Germany as made evident by the conveyance of the Glossators. 
Naturally, the division of the influence of Roman law into these two categories 
does not mean the denial of the importance of the Commentators’ work, that is, 
the acceptance of Savigny’s concept of viewing them merely as post-Glossators. 
Reception, however, was not limited to Roman law material but also extended 
to the acceptance of canon law and feudal law of the Langobards (or Lombards) 
as well. That is how the ius commune = gemeines Recht evolved, as a body of 
law pertaining to both Common law and private law, but divergent from, and 
competing with, the Landesrecht. The harmonization of the ius commune with 
local legal systems, or, in other words, the task of adapting the ius commune to 
local conditions was resolved by the so-called Practicals. 
 The readiness for the reception of Roman law, in the function of objective 
conditions, substantially differs in individual European countries. The level of 
sophistication of a given country’s (region’s) jurisprudence and political system 
is crucial with regard to reception. In significant parts of the Iberian peninsula, 
for example, the conditions in the 13th century were such that Roman law 
could become the subject of reception in the seven-volume codex, the Siete 
Partidas, of Alfonso X (the Wise). In Switzerland, in contrast, for reasons that 
could be attributed primarily to unique political conditions, reception of 
Roman law in its entirety (reception in globo) was out of the question. There is 
a close connection between Roman law and the so-called imperial law, ius 
caesareum, or Kaiserrecht. Roman law serves as the ideological foundation of 
renovatio imperii, which attains extraordinary importance during the reign of 
the dynasty of Hohenstaufen. Roman law, more precisely the ius publicum 
Romanum, is the instrument of the legitimacy of “Weltkaisertum”. The work 
best representing the Cameralist school both in its title and substance is 
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Samuel Stryk’s “Usus modernus pandectarum” from the turn of the 17th and 
18th centuries.     
 Although, on the one hand, a characteristic feature of the school of Practicals 
is that they put special emphasis on German legal practice—which results in a 
distancing from the original Roman sources—; on the other hand, another 
characteristics is the casuistic analytical methodology, nonetheless, we can talk 
about the “science of the Pandects”, for the first time, in connection with the 
Cameralists. Connecting the expression “science of the Pandects” to this 
school is correct in spite of the fact that the school itself—especially, because 
of the increasing prevalence of particularity in its views—is not capable for 
progress. Only Natural Law, unfolding in the 17th century, would be fit to 
further improve the unproductive “science of the Pandects” implemented by 
the Practicals. 
 We have to emphasize that Roman law plays an important role in the 
development of natural law doctrines. The evolution of non-antique, “modern” 
Natural Law, aptly described by Max Weber as “Entzauberung der Welt”, is 
inseparable from the concept of “ius naturale” of the Romans.16 The aspiration 
of Roman law scholars to trace ius civile back to ius naturale is a basic feature 
of the Natural Law of the 16th and 17th centuries. The influence of Roman law 
also can be found in the Christian-scholastic Natural Law. In the case of Hugo 
Grotius, who may be counted as a follower of the rationalist Natural Law 
jurisprudence, the “auctoritas” of Roman law is associated with the ius 
Romanum as “imperium rationis”. Roman law plays a cardinal role in the 
work of Samuel Pufendorf, the author of the highly influential De iure naturae 
et gentium libri octo (1672), who may be regarded as a follower of another 
secularized school of Natural Law. The fusion of “science of the Pandects” and 
Natural Law had not taken place, which could be explained, on the one hand, 
by the Common law-like approach of Natural Law, and, on the other hand, by 
the philosophical, in other words, non-legal, interests of Natural Law 
professors, a fact that demonstrated with the example of Christian Wolff 
(1679–1754), the only disciple of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, whose studies 
focused primarily on moral philosophy.         
 
 


 
16
 Regarding the Romans concept of ius naturale, see, Hamza, G.: A természetjog 
értelmezésének problémái: Cicero és a ius naturale [The Problems of the Interpretation of 
Natural Law: Cicero and the Ius Naturale], Jogtudományi Közlöny 50 (1995), 523–529. 
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III. Historical school of jurisprudence (Pandektistik) and its role in the  
  development of the European private law 
 
The fundamental conflict between Usus modernus pandectarum and Natural 
Law could have been only resolved by the Pandektistik developed in the work 
of the followers of the school of historical jurisprudence. The characteristics of 
Pandektistik, the intention of which was the creation of “the philosophy of 
positive law” (Wieacker),  include the historical point of view, building on the 
original, Justinianus’ sources, the desire for systematization, the development 
of legal theories, and, finally—as a hoped-for result of all the aforementioned—
the partition from particularism. In the light of the aforementioned, the pandect 
law of the 19th century, “heutiges römisches Recht”, should be sharply 
separated from Usus modernus pandectarum, which was dominated by the 
elements of particularism.  
 The pandectist law of the 19th century,17 which after the work of Georg 
Friedrich Puchta (1798–1846), “Pandecten”, published in 1838, is also called 
“Pandects” (Pandekten), as phrased by the German legal scholar, is the general 
theory of German private law based on Roman law principles, the function and 
importance of which is the development and expansion of the bases of the 
private law system.  
 Despite the fact that it was developed on German soil, it is not practical to 
talk about German Pandektistik exclusively, because this school i.e. trend is 
not equivalent only to the “doctrine of gemeines Recht” (Koschaker), but from 
the beginning of its development, it gained significant influence outside the 
borders of Germany.  
 In this respect, it is sufficient to consider the influence of Pandektistik in 
England. John Austin (1790–1859), who adopted Jeremy Bentham’s legal 
theories, in the analysis of legal terminology, follows the German Pandektistik. 
Characteristically, he regards Savigny’s Das Recht des Besitzes as a masterpiece 
and as the most perfect among all legal works ever written. Thibaut’s work, the 
first edition of which was published in 1803, titled System des Pandektenrechts 
also had a great influence on him. This work of Thibaut, of which eight editions 
were published between 1803 and 1834, influenced English legal scholarship 


 
17
 Regarding the Pandektistik, see, Hamza, G.: 	
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 
magánjogi rendszerek kialakulása a római jogi hagyományok alapján [Trends in the Develop-
ment of Private Law in Europe. The role of the civilian tradition in the shaping of modern 
systems of private law], Budapest, 2002. 99 sqq. and idem: Die Entwicklung des Privatrechts 
auf römischrechtlicher Grundlage unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Rechtsentwicklung 
in Deutschland, Österreich, der Schweiz und Ungarn. Budapest, 2002. 85 sqq. 
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tremendously. Nathaniel Lindley’s book titled Introduction to the Study of Juris-
prudence, published in 1845, is the translation of the general part of Thibaut’s 
aforementioned work. We further refer to the fact that in Sir Henry Maine’s 
Ancient Law, published in 1861, the influence of Pandektistik also seen.18 
 The members of the Academy of Pavia, among whom we can find experts 
of Roman law, Common law, and modern (codified) private law, in their 
efforts to codify the European law of contracts, view as their mission the 
creation of a compromise between the Roman law-based continental private 
law, and the contract constructions of Common law.  
 It is a fact that similarities may be found among numerous institutions and 
constructions of Roman law and English law. It is without doubt, at the same 
time, that essential differences appear between the views of Roman law and 
English law, which are the result of unique historical conditions. One of the 
attributes of Roman law is that it is jurisprudential law, so-called diritto 
giurisprudenziale19 that generally is not associated with the binding authority 
of preceding juridical decisions (sentences). The interpretation of jurisprudential 
law, however, could differ depending on what scientific discipline the inter-
preting scholar follows. According to Friedrich Carl von Savigny, the unique 
notion of Juristenrecht is systematization, or more precisely, a tendency-like 
aspiration for systematization. This view is especially clearly expressed in his 
work titled System des heutigen römischen Rechts. Rudolph von Jhering 
(1818–1892), who is a declared opponent of legal positivism, examines this 
problem from a very different angle. According to Jhering—primarily in his 
book titled Geist des römischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner 
Entwicklung—Roman law, viewed as basically jurisprudential law, has an 
contemporary significance with regard to methodology and ideology.  
 The jurisprudential law-quality of ius Romanum was given particular 
emphasis by Koschaker in his work titled Europa und das römische Recht. In 
Roman law, Koschaker sees an effective category of counter-ideal to legal 
positivism “elevated to absolute heights.” Koschaker, viewing Roman law as 
Juristenrecht, stresses its sharp opposition to English law. English law, clearly, 
is judge made law, which makes the difference between the two legal systems 
obvious. Ius Romanum could never be viewed—in any of the phases of its 
evolution—as precedent law. In the literature, this is pointed out—mentioning 
only a few examples—by Buckland, McNair, Schiller, Dawson, Van Caenegem, 
Pringsheim, and Peter.       


 
18
 See, Lombardi, L.: Saggio sul diritto giurisprudenziale. Milano, 1967. 
 
19
 See, Hamza, G.: Sir Henry Maine és az összehasonlító jog [Sir Henry Maine and the 
Comparative Law], Jogállam, 1998–1999. 326. sqq. 
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IV. The historical background of the convergence of Roman (civil) law 
 and Common law 
 
The jurisprudential quality of Roman law can be demonstrated in every phase 
of the development of this legal system.20 The basis for this, among other 
things, is that there is an obvious continuity between the pontifical law or juris-
prudence and the lay jurisprudence. Examining its judge-made or Common 
law-like attributes, we have to point to the unique historical development, and 
not the least, to the unique ideological characteristics of this legal system. With 
relation to the doctrine of stare decisis, we may refer to some characteristics of 
the English ius consuetudinarium. It deserves emphasis that in English law (see, 
e.g., leg. Henr. IX. 9.), the interpretation of statutes takes place in a fairly 
elastic manner. The judge is less bound by the statutes, or more precisely, by 
the texts thereof, than by previous judicial decisions. Bracton, the author of De 
legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae, is in effect the first—although previously 
there are signs of this view at Glanvill—to provide the theoretical support of 
the vigor of binding precedent. This is shown studiously in the doctrine of 
“…Si tamen similia evenerint, per simile iudicentur, dum bona est occasio a 
similibus procedere ac similia” (De leg. f. 1 b).   
 An important difference between Roman law and English law is the Roman 
iurisperiti’s so called ars distinguendi, expressed in some responsa of them as 
the “art” that is capable of distinguishing between the relevant, the legally 
relevant, and the irrelevant. As the result of this ars distinguendi, the high level 
abstraction capability of Roman iurisperiti (iurisconsulti), which was always 
separated from Roman law by the communis opinio, is clearly demonstrable. 
Here, we wish to refer to the fact that, oddly, even Fritz Schulz writes about 
the Romans’ aversion to abstraction.  
 In some of the responsa, indeed, only the legally valuable elements 
submerge, which is in diametric contrast to the relation of ratio decidendi and 
obiter dicta that melt together and are practically inseparable in the decisions of 
Anglo-Saxon courts. The “ars abstrahendi,” already affecting legal scholars 
working in the last centuries of the pre-classical era, constitutes the real 
demarcation line between the mentality of Romans and the legal thinking of 
Anglo-Saxons. We have to point out that in some relations, —it is especially 
valid for “stare decisis,” arising in relation to the ius respondendi, that is a clearly 
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 Regarding the jurisprudence of Roman law, see, Földi, A.—Hamza, G.: A római jog 
története és insitúciói [The History and Institutions of Roman Law]. 8th, revised and 
extended edition, Budapest, 2003. 84 sqq. 
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mutatis mutandis characteristic of Roman law—even within Roman law, there 
are certain signs of the guiding authority of precedent legal-scholarly opinions.    
 In the domain of Roman law, the question of judicial precedents is 
significant in the field of its comparison with English law. We may examine the 
significance of precedents based on both legal and non-legal sources. The law 
of inheritance—besides the law of gift21—, is extremely important in this 
relation, and what is more, it has explicit paradigmatic significance. In the law 
of inheritance, the weight of previous decisions can especially be ascertained 
in connection with querela inofficiosi testamenti. In the domain of contract law 
we may mention compensatio, in which the responsa originated in earlier 
times are given greater weight. This weight, naturally, is expressed through the 
recognition of the normative authority of certain legal principles. Furthermore, 
the problem of ius singulare is also important with regards to the examination 
of precedents. Namely, in the case of ius singulare—for example, in relation 
with a privilege—in aliis similibus can be interpreted, cautiously, obviously, in 
light of previous cases. 
 Stare decisis plays a prominent role in the development of modern English 
law. Naturally, in modern judicature, there is a sharp distinction between ratio 
decidendi and obiter dicta, that frequently allots a difficult task to those 
applying the law, which fact is often referred to in the legal literature of for 
example, Montrose, Simpson, Derham, Allen, Cross, and Paton. Stare decisis, 
after all, is attributable to the fact that the most essential element of English 
law is the decision-making activity of the judge, whom Dawson rightly calls, 
in this respect, the “oracle of law.”  
 
 
V. Concluding remarks 
 
In the development of European private law, convergence plays an increasing 
role. In the new legal literature, many authors, for example, James Gordley22 
and Paolo Gallo,23 writes about the materialization of the differences between 
Common law and civil law (Roman law), and, what is more, about the 
disappearance of differences in the sphere of many legal institutions. In the 
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 See, Dawson, J. P.: Gifts and Promises, Continental and American Law Compared. 
New Haven–London, 1980. 
 
22
 See, Gordley, J.: «Common law» v. «civil law» Una distinzione che va 
scomparendo? In: Scritti in onore di R. Sacco I. Milano, 1994. 559. 
 
23
 See, Gallo, P.: La recezione dei modelli continentali nel diritto inglese delle 
obbligazioni. In: Scritti in onore di R. Sacco I. Milano, 1994. 473–494. 
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field of contract law, many institutions and constructions of continental law are 
subject to reception in English law. It deserves attention that with regards to 
terminology, certain English authors, in connection with English private law, 
explicitly refer to the role of Roman law tradition.24 
 The private law of European countries, no doubt, to a different extent and 
building on different historical traditions, is connected to Roman law. This is 
more and more obvious in a period of decreasing or even disappearing 
differences, often motivated by political interests, between certain “legal fields” 
and “legal families.” Not even differing traditions of culture and civilization 
constitute obstacles to the differing extent of the reception of Roman law. It 
follows from the foregoing that it is justifiable to consider the significant role of 
Roman law in the efforts to unify the private law in Europe.  
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 See, English Private Law. I–II. (ed.: P. Birks), Oxford, 2000. 
